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In this paper a fiscal consolidation program for India has been presented based 
on a policy simulation model that enables us to examine the macroeconomic 
implications of alternative fiscal strategies, given certain assumptions about 
other macro policy choices and relevant exogenous factors. The model is then 
used  to  estimate  the  outcomes  resulting  from  a  possible  strategy  of  fiscal 
consolidation in the base case. The exercise shows that it is possible to have 
fiscal consolidation while at the same time maintaining high GDP growth of 
around 8% or so. The strategy is to gradually bring down the revenue deficit to 
zero  by  2014-15,  while  allowing  a  combined  fiscal  deficit  for  centre  plus 
states of about 6% of GDP. This provides the space for substantial government 
capital  expenditure,  which  translates  to  a  significant  public  investment 
program. This in turn leads to high overall investment directly and indirectly, 
via the crowding in effect on private investment, which drives the high GDP 
growth. The exercise has also tested the robustness of this strategy under two 
alternative scenarios of higher and lower advanced country growth compared 
to the base case. 
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The  Thirteenth  Finance  Commission  (henceforth  The  Commission)  was 
mandated to recommend a fiscal consolidation program for implementation by 
central and state governments. This task was made particularly challenging by 
the global financial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 
11
th September 2008. India did not suffer a deep recession like most developed 
countries. However, the recession in developed countries resulted in a decline 
in demand for Indian exports to those countries. This effect was compounded 
by  considerable  volatility  in  financial  markets,  triggered  by  the  rapid 
withdrawal of portfolio investments by foreign institutional investors (FIIs) 
and a sharp squeeze  of liquidity, resulting in severe  demand  deficiency  in 
several sectors of the real economy. The combined effect of the external crisis 
transmitted through these two main channels resulted in a significant dip in 
India’s growth from around 9% in the recent past to only 6.7% in FY2008-
2009.  
 
A strong fiscal stimulus became necessary in the second half of FY 2008-2009 
and again in FY2009-2010 to help revive growth. The positive impact of this 
stimulus became evident especially during the last two quarters of FY 2009-
2010. At the same time the stimulus entailed a further deterioration of the 
fiscal  condition,  which  was  challenging  even  before t h e  g l o b a l  c r i s i s  g o t  
underway.  One  of  the  key  tasks  before  the  Commission  was  to  propose  a 
program  of  revenue  and  public  expenditure  for  the  federal  and  state 
governments that takes the economy back to a sustainable fiscal path along 
with  high  growth.  The  NIPFP  policy  simulation  model ( h e n ce f o r t h N I P F P  
model) was used to assist the Commission in addressing this question. This 
paper reports on that exercise. 
 
Alternative approaches to macroeconomic policy simulation are discussed in 
section  2,  which  also  provides  the  rationale  for  choosing  a  traditional 
Tinbergen-Goldberger-Klein type structural model (henceforth Tinbergen type 
model) as the appropriate macro-economic policy simulation tool. The model 
itself is presented in section 3. In its present application the model enables us 
to  examine  the  macroeconomic  implications  of alternative  fiscal  strategies, 
given  certain  assumptions  about  other  macro  policy  choices  and  relevant 
exogenous  factors,  such  as  the  state  of  the  global  economy  and  world  oil 
prices.  The  model  is  then  used  to  estimate  the  outcomes  resulting  from  a 
possible strategy of fiscal consolidation in the base case discussed in section-4. 
The  possible consequences  of this strategy under altered global conditions, 
both positive and negative, are also examined by perturbing the exogenous 
assumptions  relating  to  future  growth  performance  of  advanced  countries. 
Section-5 concludes. Appendix 1 states the data sources. Appendix 2 presents 
the estimated equations. Appendix 3 describes some ratios and definitions that 
have been used for the empirical estimation of the model.   4 
2. Approaches to Macroeconomic Policy Simulation 
 
 
The  idea  that  a  Keynesian  (or  any  other)  macroeconomic  model  with 
empirically estimated functions and behavioural parameters, and some degrees 
of freedom, could be used to derive the required values of a vector of policy 
(instrument) variables that would generate the desired values of a vector of 
target  variables  (outcomes)  was  first  spelt  out  in  Tinbergen’s  theory  of 
economic  policy  (Tinbergen  1967).  However,  empirical  application  of  this 
approach  had  already  started  in  the  1950s  with  the  structuralist 
macroeconometric models of Klein and Goldberger (1955) that followed the 
neoclassical synthesis of Keynesian economics in Hick’s IS-LM framework 
(Hicks 1937). After a clear run of almost two decades Tinbergen theory, and 
it’s empirical application in Klein-Goldberger type structural macroeconomic 
models (henceforth  Tinbergen models) came  under  attack  in  the  1970s  for 
several reasons. Keynesian policies had failed to tackle the phenomenon of 
‘stagflation’, rising unemployment and rising inflation at the same time. This 
fuelled a growing hostility towards dirigisme, or government activism, during 
the Reagan-Thatcher years of market fundamentalism. While Friedman and 
the monetarists (Friedman & Schwartz 1971) led the intellectual attack against 
Keynesianism, the attack against Tinbergen type policy modelling was led by 
the emerging paradigm of ‘rational expectations’, and in particular the Lucas 
critique.   
 
To understand the Lucas critique, it is useful to view macroeconomic policy 
making as a Stackelberg game in which the government is the Stackleberg 
leader  setting  policy  while  all  private  agents,  firms  and  households  are 
followers responding to Government policy. In a seminal paper that came to 
symbolize  what  Mishkin  (1996)  has  called  the  ‘rational  expectation 
revolution’, Robert Lucas (1976) argued that the behaviour of private firms 
and households is not policy independent.  If behaviours change in response to 
policy changes then structural parameters of the policy model, based on past 
behaviour  of  individual  private  entities,  will  become  invalid.  As  such 
structural relationships estimated on the basis of past behaviour may no longer 
be valid.  Building on his critique Kydland and Prescott (1977) demonstrated 
in  another  seminal  paper  that  optimal  policies  would  necessarily  be  time 
inconsistent because an optimal policy based on current behaviour may not be 
optimal post changes in behaviour of private agents in response to that policy.
1 
 
                                                  
1 An alternative class of structuralist models replace time series estimated parameters with 
parameters calibrated by solving a computable general equilibrium model for some base year 
(Dutt & Ross 2003, Taylor 2004). For a recent application to India see Naastepad (1999). 
These models are also subject to the same Lucas critique.  Non-structural models usually used 
for unconditional forecasts, such as the vector autoregression models due to Sims (1980), are 
not subject to the Lucas critique, but on the other hand they are also not very useful for 
comparing the outcomes of alternative policy decisions.   5 
These  key  papers  and a  host  of  others  that  together constitu te th e r ati onal  
expectations  revolution  have  fundamentally  changed  the  landscape  of 
macroeconomics  and  the  way  policymakers  approach  macroeconomic 
policies. There is greater focus now on long term issues, the importance of 
time  consistency  and  the  credibility  of  announced  policies.  Nevertheless, 
policymakers  have  continued  to  primarily  draw  on  traditional  Tinbergen 
models as policy tools despite the emergence of an alternative genre of real 
business cycle (RBC) models that grew out of the Lucas critique (Gali, 2008). 
In these models business cycles are driven by Lucas’s ‘deep’ variables such as 
technology and consumer preferences that are policy independent. Mis hkin 
suggests  that  policy  makers  are  not  comfortable  with  these  RBC  models 
because they do not reflect the behaviour of real economies. He mentions that 
the RBC theorists tend to reject disconfirming evidence, attributing it to faulty 
data rather than any fault in their theories (Prescott 1986).   
 
There  are  also  other  reasons  for  the  continuing  recourse  to  traditional 
Tinbergen models despite the Lucas critique. First, not all policy choices are 
choices  between  alternative  policy  rules,  and  some  choices  may  merely 
represent alternative values of policy variables within a given policy rule, and 
these need not affect behaviour.  For this class of policy choices, Tinbergen 
models are no more subject to the Lucas critique than the models based on the 
‘deep’  micro-foundation  variables  that  he  recommended.  Second,  the 
information  requirements  of  micro-foundation  based  RBC  models,  such  as 
Bayesian  Dynamic  Stochastic  General  Equilibrium  (DSGE)  models,  are  so 
large that they are not easily applicable in real world economies, especially 
developing economies. Thus, while DSGE modelling is an important field of 
contemporary  research  on  macroeconomic  policy  simulation,  it  is  not  an 
available option for comparing between alternative policy choices at present
2. 
 
The  information  question  points  to  more  fundamental i s s u e s  a b o u t  t h e  
behavioural foundations of real business cycle theory. In this paradigm policy 
choices are  posed  as  options for  welfare  maximization  in a context  where 
macro relations aggregate the behaviour of individual agents maximizing their 
respective utility functions. However, the assumed optimizing behaviour of 
individual agents that provides the micro-foundation of RBC theory, as indeed 
much of standard economic theory, is a matter of belief rather than scientific 
evidence. There is a growing body of disconfirming evidence in the field of 
behavioural  economics  that  economic  agents  do  not  in  fact  manifest 
optimizing behaviour. Behavioural economics is founded on the early insight 
of  Herbert  Simon  (1957)  that  economic  models  would  be  much  better 
                                                  
2  Early experiments with DSGE modelling in India have generated some promising insights. 
See  for  instance  the  evidence  on  ‘financial  acceleration’  and  volatility  (Anand,  Peiris,  & 
Saxegaard   2010). NIPFP also  has an ongoing research  program on DSGE  modelling for 
India. For an initial output from this programme see the paper by Batini, Gabriel, Levine & 
Pearlman (2010) which compares domestic inflation targeting under floating and managed 
exchange rate regimes.   6 
approximations  of reality  if they  assumed that  individual  agents  engage  in 
what  he  termed  ‘satisficing’  behaviour.  The  central conc lus ion o f r epea ted  
empirical  verification  in  behavioural  economics  is  that  given  the  limits  of 
cognitive capacity, economic agents look for satisfactory options rather than 
best options. Typically, in making choices, agents restrict the information they 
are prepared to process to a limited information set, and choose the best option 
based on that limited information set, i.e., bounded rationality (Kahnemann 
2003). This applies not only to decision making under conditions of certainty 
but also decision making under conditions of risk (Kahnemann and Versky 
1997).  
 
The  micro-foundations  of  the  normative  policy  making  process  implicit  in 
RBC models are also subject to a similar critique. Building on the insights of 
institutional  economics  (North  1990,  Williamson  1985)  and  public  choice 
theory (Buchanan & Tullock 1962), Dixit has argued that the assumption of an 
omnipotent,  omniscient,  welfare  maximizing  benevolent  dictator  is 
inappropriate for policy analysis (Dixit 1996). In Dixit’s view policy making 
is  essentially  a  multi-stage  political  process  constrained  by  varieties  of 
asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard. In some cases a 
particular policy game may be modelled with one principal and many agents. 
In other games, the policy maker is a single agent dealing simultaneously with 
multiple  principals.  Dixit  has  tried  to  capture  this  rich  variety  of  policy 
contexts within the general approach of transaction cost politics. However, this 
broad  approach  is  yet to  be  developed  into  a general  model  of  the  policy 
process that can serve as an appropriate micro-foundation for RBC theory.
3 
  
These  open  questions  regarding  the  micro-foundations  of  RBC  theory, 
combined  with  its  very  demanding  data  requirements  for  empirical 
application, probably account for the continuing popularity of Tinbergen type 
models.  The  principle of parsimony  would  suggest that Tinbergen models, 
with their much less demanding information requirements, are better tools for 
macroeconomic policy simulation in the present state of our knowledge. In 
India, although building of Tinbergen type structural models started from early 
1960s, large economy-wide models emerged only in the late 1980s.  Several 
such models were built to address different policy questions
4. Over time these 
models became increasingly complex, highly disaggregated and intractable. 
Recent research in this genre has tended to build relatively simple core models 




                                                  
3 It is quite likely that the large variety of policy contexts envisaged in Dixit’s approach may 
not be reducible to a single general model of the policy process. For some early attempts to 
model the political economy of macroeconomic policy see Persson & Tabellini (1994). 
4 See Krishnamurthy (2008) for an excellent survey of Indian macroeconometric models. 
5 For a recent small macroeconometric model applied to high frequency data see Bhanumurthy 
& Kumawat (2009).   7 




The NIPFP model presented here belongs to this Tinbergen tradition. It has 
been  developed  as  a  tool  that  policymakers  can  use  to  assess  the  likely 
consequences  of  alternative  policy  choices.  Policy  decisions  are  primarily 
based on intuition, the political decision makers’ judgement about the likely 
consequences  of  her  action.  However,  it  helps  the  cautious  policymaker  a 
great deal if she can cross check her judgement with model simulated test runs 
of  her  policy,  provided  of  course  that  the  model  itself  is  a  reasonable 
approximation of reality.  
 
To effectively serve as a user friendly policy tool for this purpose, the model 
has to have three key characteristics. First, it has to be applicable. It should be 
possible to run the model based on data that is actually available and it should 
not have data requirements that are impossible to meet. Second, the model has 
to be flexible, amenable to adjustments in its structure to address the specific 
policy  questions  policy  makers  may  ask  from  time  to t i m e ,  a n d  p r o v i d e  
answers in the form that is required. Finally, the model has to be transparent, 
simple  enough  for  the  non-specialist  policymaker  to a t  l e a s t  b r o a d l y  
understand the structure and mechanics of the model, or the chain of cause-
effect relationships that lead from her policy choice to a particular outcome 
under given conditions as specified in the model.  
 
The NIPFP model has been developed to meet these characteristics. It is a 
simultaneous equations system model developed for policy simulation. Hence, 
the  main  results  presented  below  are  not  unconditional  forecasts  but 
conditional  indicators  of  what  would  be  the  outcome f o r ,  s a y ,  g r o w t h  o r  
inflation if a particular set of policies were adopted and under an assumed, but 
hopefully realistic, set of exogenous conditions. In other words the exercise is 
the nature of ‘if, then’ statements which estimate the likely outcomes if certain 
policy  and  external  conditions  prevail.  It  is  also  a  fairly  simple  model, 
consisting of only 22 equations. There are 13 behavioural relationships and 9 
identities. The model has been kept deliberately simple to make the cause-
effect relationships transparent and not a black box as often happens in very 
large models. This enables us to easily see how particular policy or exogenous 
variables are affecting the outcome variables. The model is also quite flexible 
and easily adaptable to answer different types of policy questions. Thus, the 
instrument and target variables can be interchanged to fit the question being 
asked. Sub-components of  the model  can easily  be  expanded  if the  policy 
question  requires  such  detail  on  one  or  another  aspect  of  the  model.  It  is 
therefore  in  the  very  nature  of  this  model  that it  will  always  be  ‘work  in 
progress’. There is no ‘final’ version of this model and it will be adapted from 
time to time to address the specific policy question being asked. In the present   8 
application the model has been applied to track the macro-economic outcomes 
of a fiscal consolidation path.  
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the model is theoretically eclectic rather 
than  purist,  picking  up  elements  from  different  theoretical  approaches  as 
required by the empirical realities of the Indian economy. To illustrate, the 
inflation function in equation (2) has elements of demand-supply based price 
formation, where markets are cleared through price adjustment, as well as cost 
plus mark-up pricing where markets are cleared through quantity adjustments, 
and also an administered price component because we believe that all three 
price  formation  rules  apply  in  different  segments  of  the  Indian  economy 
(Mundle & Mukhopadhyay 1993). That being said, it should be mentioned 
that  the  model  is  essentially  Keynesian  in  nature  since  output  levels  are 
demand determined rather than supply constrained (Bhaduri 1990). Given the 
persistence  of  high  levels  of  involuntary  unemployment,  either  open  or 
disguised,  we  believe  that  this  is  the  appropriate  specification  for  India. 
Capacity constraints enter the picture only in the form of utilization levels 






The aggregate (nominal) demand in the economy in period t (Yt ) is given by  
     …         …           …             …               …                           ( 1 )  
 
where  Ct i s  a g g r e g a t e  p r i v a t e  c o n s u m p t i o n  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  
p
t I  i s  a g g r e g a t e  
private investment demand, 
g
t I  is aggregate government investment,  t G  is  
aggregate government consumption expenditure, 
t
t B  is the aggregate balance 
of trade in goods and services, and  t L  is net inflow of invisibles (remittances 
etc.). Therefore,  t
t
t L B +  is the net current account balance. 
It is assumed that there is a ‘fix price’ segment of the economy where prices 
are determined as a mark-up over cost and another segment where prices are 
administered by the government. In both these segments the market is cleared 
through quantity adjustments. There is a third segment of the economy, e.g., 
food  grain  sector  above  the  threshold  price,  where  the  market  is  cleared 
through price adjustments in response to excess demand or supply. Excess 
demand  in  turn  is  dependent  on  rainfall,  which  is  a m a j o r  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  
annual  variations  in  food  grain  supply.  Hence  the  rate  of  change  in  the 
                                                  
6  In  the  following  system  of  equations  the  notation  convention  adopted  is  to  denote  all 
exogenous variables with a bar [ x ], all policy variables with a hat [ x ˆ  ], and growth rates 







t t t L B G I I C Y + + + + +    9 
aggregate price level (inflation) is assumed to depend on liquidity, measured 
by the rate of change of money supply, cost push factors such as the rate of 
change  in  administered  prices  and  production  costs, a n d  r a i n f a l l .  T h u s ,  
inflation in period t ( t p  ) is given by 
( ) t t
a
t t t V A p M p , , ˆ , 1       =      …   …   …   …   ( 2 )  
where  t M1   is the growth rate of narrow money, 
a
t p ˆ   is the rate of change in the 
level of administered prices,  t A  is the rate of change in factor costs (wage, rent 
and interest costs), and  t V  is the index of rainfall in period t. In the estimated 
equation system all the inflation determinants are significant with expected 
signs (Appendix 2).  
There  is  an  accelerator  type  private  investment  function,  where  private 
investment is assumed to depend on the cost of capital as well as the crowding 
in effect of public investment, and the expected rate of capacity utilization. 
































, ,        …   …   …   …   ( 3 )  
where  t r  is the average cost of borrowing from the domestic credit market (i.e. 
average nominal interest rate of scheduled commercial banks and some of the 
major  term  lending  institutions  like  ICICI,  IDBI  etc.), 
g
t I  i s  g o v e r n m e n t  
investment in period t, 
e
t Z  is the expected real output in year t and 
c
t Z  is the 
real full capacity output in period t. The latter (
c
t Z ) is based on the capital 
stock existing at the beginning of the year t.  
 
                                                                      …..      …..      …..      ….          (4)    
where k is the capital-output ratio and  1   t K  is the real capital stock at the 





t t t I I K K 1 1 2 1         + +                      … . .               … . .             … . .             … .                     ( 5)    
Following  an  adaptive  expectations  approach  (Enders 2 0 0 4 ) ,  e x p e c t e d  r e a l  
output in period t (
e
t Z ) is given by: 
t t
e
t Z Z Z
~
1   +          …   …   …   …   ( 6 )  
where Zt-1 is actual GDP of the previous period and  t Z
~
   is the predicted first 
difference of GDP in period t. This is derived from equation 7. 
1
1




Z  10 
t Z
~
  = f( 1
2
1,         t t Z Z )     …  …  …  …  (7) 
where   1     t Z  is the first difference of real output in the previous period and 
1
2
    t Z  is the second difference of real output in the previous period. 
'
1    
t Z >0 
&
' 2
1    
t Z <0. The r.h.s. determinants are all significant with expected signs in 




Nominal aggregate government current expenditure ( t G ) is given by 
) ˆ , ( 1 t t t W G f G   =      …  …  …  …  ( 8 )  
where  t W ˆ  i s  t h e  r e v e n u e  e x p e n d i t u r e  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  p e r i o d  t ,  a  p o l i c y  
variable. 














T        …   …   …   …   ( 9 )    
where revenue buoyancy    ˆ  is a policy determined variable. It is assumed that 
government  can  set  this  through  adjustments  in  tax  rates  and  the 
administrative tax effort. 
All  government  capital  expenditure  does  not  flow  into  investment  and  all 
public investment does not come from the government budget alone, since it is 
supplemented  by  investment  of  internal  surpluses  of p u b l i c  s e c t o r  
undertakings.  However,  the  two  are  closely  correlated.  Hence,  public 
investment is assumed to be a function of government capital expenditure:  
                                                                                                        …       …         …          …       (10) 
where  is  the  capital  expenditure  of  government  in  period  t,  a  policy 
variable.  The  r.h.s  variables  in  behavioural  equations  (8)  and  (10)  are  all 
significant  with  expected  signs  in  the  estimated  system  of  equations 
(Appendix 2). 
The fiscal deficit in period t ( t F ) is given by 
















t t t O D N T S W F ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ   +       +    11 
where 
g
t D  is the aggregate market borrowing of the government in period 
t,
g
t N ˆ  is  non-debt capital receipts of the government (disinvestment etc.) and 
g
t O ˆ    is the change in fiscal reserves. 
 External Block 
 
The trade balance in terms of domestic currency in period t (
t
t B ) is given by 
t t
t
t M X B          …  …  …  …  (12) 
where  t X  is the value of exports (including services) and  t M  is the value of 
imports (including services) in period t. 
Export  demand  was  initially  assumed  to  depend  on  the competitiveness of 
Indian products, measured by average tariffs as a proxy, the exchange rate, 
and the income of advanced countries, which account for the bulk of Indian 
exports. However, in the empirical estimation the exchange rate turned out to 
be insignificant. Hence, we have   
( )
a
t t t Y U f X , ˆ =    …                       …                       …                 …   ( 1 3 )  
where  t U ˆ  is the policy determined average tariff rate and 
a
t Y  is the GDP of 
advanced countries, an exogenous variable.  
The value of imports is assumed to depend on the exchange rate, the price of 
imported oil and oil related products, and domestic income. Hence, 
( ) t
o
t t t Y P e f M , , =    …   …   …   …   ( 1 4 )  
where  t e  is the nominal exchange rate (Rs/US$), 
o
t P is the import price of oil 
and petroleum products of Indian basket in terms of domestic currency, an 
exogenous variable, and Yt is nominal GDP in period t. The r.h.s. variables are 
significant with expected signs in the estimated equations (appendix 2). 
The nominal exchange rate is assumed to be a function of the net inflow of 
foreign capital. 
Thus: 
( ) t t J f e =      …                       …                         …               …     ( 1 5 )  
 
where  t J  is net foreign capital inflow. It has also been verified that other 
variables such as the trade balance and interest rate do not have a significant 
effect  on the exchange  rate at present. The  determinant is  significant with 
expected sign in the estimated equation.   12 
Net capital inflow  t J  is assumed to be a function of the level of income in the 
United States (
us
t Y ), the major origin of foreign capital flows to India, and 
China (
c
t Y ), the main competing destination for these flows, and Indian GDP 
( t Y ) as a proxy for domestic demand. 




t t Y Y Y f J =    …                       …                         …               …     ( 1 6 )  
It has been verified that capital inflow is not causally dependent on either the 
domestic-external interest rate differential or the exchange rate. 
The net inflow of invisibles ( t L ) is assumed to be a function of aggregate 
output of advanced (OECD) countries (
a
t Y ) and the Middle East (
me
t Y ), these 
being the two major sources of remittances.  




t t Y Y f L + =    …                       …                         …               …     ( 1 7 )  
The r.h.s arguments in equation 16 and 17 are all significant and have the 
expected signs. 
The balance of payments identity in period t (
p
t B ) is given by 




t R J L B B            …  …  …  …  (18)  




Narrow  money  ( t M1  )  has  been  chosen  as  the  estimate  of  money  supply 
instead of broad money because the money multiplier was found to be more 
stable for the former. Given the value of the money multiplier, the change in 
narrow money supply in period t ( t M1  ) is given by  
) ( 1 t t H M     =        …   …   …   …   ( 1 9 )  
where  t H   is  t h e  c h an g e  i n  h ig h - p o w e r ed  mo n e y  s u pp l y  in  p er i od  t  .  The 
growth of high powered money ( t H  ) is in turn assumed to be a function of 
total government borrowing (
g
t D ) and change in foreign exchange reserves 
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where  1   t H  i s  t h e  v o l u m e  o f  h i g h - p o w e r e d  m o n e y  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  period. 
Total government borrowing is given by 




tc D ˆ   i s  g o v e r n m e n t  b o r r o w i n g  f r o m  R B I  a n d  
g
mt D ˆ  i s  g o v e r n m e n t  
borrowing from the market.  
Finally, the average nominal rate of interest is assumed to be a function of the 
rate of inflation, the policy rate and the volume of government borrowing from 
the market, the potential crowding out element
7. Hence,  
 
                                                                    .…         …        …        …         (22) 
where  t i ˆ  is the repo rate (bank rate before 2004-05) of RBI in period t. The 
r.h.s variables are significant with expected signs in estimated equations (19), 
(20), and (22). 
 
Variables of Interest   
The key policy variables in solving this model include revenue and capital 
expenditure,  tax  buoyancy,  the  rate  of  change  in  administered  prices,  the 
policy interest rates, government borrowing from the market and (formerly) 
from RBI. The important exogenous variables include the growth of output in 
OECD countries as a group as well as in the USA, China, and the Middle East; 
world oil prices; and the rainfall index. A scenario is designed by setting the 
value of both the policy variables as well as the exogenous variables. The 
outcome variables of interest in each scenario include the growth rate, the 
inflation  rate  and  the  public  debt-GDP  ratio  as  well  as  some  other  key 
macroeconomic ratios, i.e., the investment rate; the trade deficit and current 
account deficit relative to GDP; the tax-GDP ratio, the revenue deficit-GDP 




The model has been estimated using annual data for the period 1991-92 to 
2008-09, taking care of time series properties. The standard diagnostic tests 
have also  been applied. The model has  been solved for  the sample  period 
2000-01  to  2008-09  and  validated  for  this  period.  The  root  mean  square 
                                                  
7 See, however, Palley (2002) and others of the ‘endogenous money’ school who maintain that 
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percentage errors for all the key variables are shown in table 1. The tests show 
that the model is robust and performs well against actual outcomes for the 
sample period. Fig 1 shows the plots of estimated outcome variables against 
their actual values in the sample period. It is noted that the estimated model 
captures many though not all of the turning points in actual outcomes.  
Table 1: Historical Validation of the Model 
Description  RMSPE  Description  RMSPE 
Private Consumption  1.89  Net Capital Inflow  6.25 
Government Consumption  1.58  Invisible (Remittances) 4 . 8 9  
Govt. Current Expenditure  0.72  Rupee/US dollar exchange rate  2.16 
Private Investment  2.43  Prime lending rate  1.00 
Public Investment  3.67  Narrow Money Supply (M1)  2.49 
Govt. Capital Expenditure  5.76  GDP Deflator  1.26 
Total Govt. Revenue  1.54  Inflation (WPI)  6.80 
Fiscal Deficit  1.35  Nominal output (factor cost)  1.15 
Total Government Debt  3.03  Nominal output (market price)  1.35 
Exports Including Services  1.15  Real output (factor cost)  0.28 
Imports Including Services  1.66  Real output (market price)  0.61 
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Figure 1  
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4. A Proposed Fiscal Consolidation Program 
 
The model developed above has been applied to assess the macro economic 
consequences of a fiscal consolidation program that eliminates the combined 
revenue deficit of the federal and state governments by the year 2014-15. This 
is the base case and the basic strategy. Two more scenarios are then examined 
to test the robustness of outcomes in the base case. An optimistic case where 
the rates of growth of the advanced countries are assumed to be 50% higher 
than  those  forecast  by  the  IMF,  and  a  pessimistic  case  of  ‘double-dip’ 
recession where the rates of growth of USA and other advanced countries are 
assumed to fall to (-)1% and 0% in 2010-11 and 2011-12 respectively, and 
then gradually recover to the IMF forecast rate of 2.6% by the terminal year 
2014-15. All other specifications are the same in these two cases as in the base 
case. 
 
The Base Case 
 The outcomes resulting from a basic fiscal strategy of gradually eliminating 
the revenue deficit by 2014-15 have been first estimated for the base case, 
which is defined by the following assumptions: 
1.  In the real sector the output-capital ratio is assumed to remain constant 
at its current level of 0.375 and factor costs are assumed to rise at the 
rate of 4% per year. Administered prices are assumed to rise at the rate 
of 5% per year through the reference period. 
2.  In the monetary field, the policy(repo) rate has been held constant at 
6% 
3.  In  the  external  sector  the  base  case  assumes  that  the  advanced 
countries,  India’s  major  trading  partners  and  important  sources  of 
remittances, will grow at the rates forecast by the IMF. USA, China 
and the Middle East, respectively the main source of foreign capital, 
the main competing destination of foreign capital, and one of the major 
sources of remittances, are also assumed to grow at the rate forecast by 
the IMF. The import weighted average tariffs are assumed to remain at 
the same level as at present, i.e., 9%. The weighted average price of the 
Indian  basket  of  petroleum,  oil  and  lubricant  products  have  been 
assumed to remain at the same level for the reference period as the 
average price recorded for the period 2006-07 to 2008-09. 
4.  The largest set of assumptions relate to the fiscal block. On the revenue 
side, after smoothening the recent spurt in corporate and income tax 
buoyancy,  it  is  assumed  that  there  will  be  no  major p o l i c y  o r  
performance  changes  affecting  revenue  collection,  implying  that 
revenue  buoyancy  remains  unchanged  at  its  medium  term  level  of   17 
1.225.
8 On the expenditure side, nominal public investment is assumed 
to increase at 10% per year. It is also assumed that there will be no off-
budget items for the reference period and that there will be no change 
in fiscal reserves during this period. 
 
The impact on key macroeconomic outcomes of a gradual reduction in the 
combined revenue deficit of the centre plus states to zero by 2014-15 in this 
base case is shown in table 2. 
 




























2010-11  8.1  7.6  33.7  2.7  10.3  5.9  21.1  75.0 
2011-12  9.0  4.1  33.4  2.2  9.0  4.4  21.3  75.1 
2012-13  9.2  4.2  34.0  2.4  7.6  3.0  21.5  73.6 
2013-14  9.3  4.0  35.1  2.8  6.1  1.5  21.7  70.8 
2014-15  8.4  4.0  36.3  3.4  5.9  0.0  21.8  68.8 
 
In this scenario, the current account deficit rises to about 3.2% of GDP by 
2014-15 and inflation remains moderate at just over 4%, except for a spike to 
7.6% in the initial year. This is essentially the ‘base effect’ of a very low 
inflation  rate  in  2009-10.  The  revenue  -  GDP  ratio  is  estimated  at  around 
21.8%. The combined fiscal deficit of the centre and states as a ratio of GDP 
declines to about 6% by 2014-15 as the revenue deficit shrinks to zero (by 
assumption), implying government capital expenditure of around 6% of GDP 
in the terminal year. The corresponding public debt - GDP ratio is estimated at 
about  67.5%,  which  is  quite  reasonable  compared  to  international 
benchmarks
9. Based on these estimates, the 13
th Finance Commission set a 
target of reducing the public debt to GDP ratio to 68% by 2014-15. This was 
subsequently incorporated in the fiscal consolidation programme introduced 
by the Central Government in the 2010-11 budget.  
                                                  
8 This assumption will clearly have to be revised following the adoption of a new direct taxes 
code  and  the  introduction  of  Goods  and Services  Tax  (GST).  The impact  of  these  major 
expected reforms of the tax system on revenue buoyancy could be significant but cannot be 
estimated at present. 
9  There  is  no  theoretically  robust  rule  about  the  level  of  sustainable  public  debt.  For  a 
compelling analysis of the limitations of the Domar rule and other attempts to derive a general 
rule for sustainable debt see Rakshit (2005).   18 
The  most  interesting  implication  of  these  results  is  that  a  strategy  of 
compressing  the  revenue  deficit  down  to  zero  creates  the  space  for 
government  capital  expenditure  of  around  6%  of  GDP, l e a d i n g  t o  a  h i g h  
public investment rate. The crowding-in effect translates this to high private 
investment and an impressive total investment rate of over 36% of GDP by 
2014-15. It is this high investment rate that largely accounts for the estimated 
high  growth  rate  of  over  8.5%  through  most  of  the  reference  period.  An 
important concern is that the current account balance is likely to worsen in 
future since India may continue to grow at a faster rate than its major trading 
partners. 
Alternative Scenarios  
 
The robustness of these outcomes are tested under two alternative scenarios 
with  optimistic  and  pessimistic  assumptions  regarding  the  external  growth 
environment. These alternative assumptions are important because growth of 
the advanced countries drives the growth of Indian exports, with knock-on 
effects on overall growth. The optimistic scenario assumes 50% higher growth 
compared to the base case in the advanced countries.  




























2010-11  8.1  7.6  33.7  2.7  10.3  5.9  21.1  75.0 
2011-12  9.6  4.1  33.3  2.0  9.0  4.4  21.3  74.6 
2012-13  10.0  4.2  33.9  2.0  7.6  3.0  21.6  72.7 
2013-14  10.2  4.1  34.9  2.2  6.2  1.5  21.9  69.5 
2014-15  9.2  4.0  36.1  2.9  5.9  0.0  22.1  67.2 
 
The main change in outcomes in this case, compared to the base case, is that 
the growth rate is higher, reaching 10% in two years of the reference period. 
Inflation remains modest at around 4% except in 2010-11 as in the base case. 
On the fiscal side the revenue-GDP ratio improves marginally, while the fiscal 
deficit  declines  to  less  than  6%  by  2014-15.  The  public  debt-GDP  ratio 
declines to 67%. On the external front, the current account deficit remains 
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2010-11  7.6  7.6  33.3  2.9  10.3  5.9  21.8  75.4 
2011-12  7.6  4.1  33.8  2.8  8.9  4.4  21.2  76.3 
2012-13  7.8  4.1  33.5  3.2  7.5  3.0  21.2  75.4 
2013-14  8.2  4.0  34.3  3.5  6.1  1.5  21.4  73.1 
2014-15  7.9  4.0  35.3  3.9  5.9  0.0  21.5  71.0 
 
In  the  pessimistic  scenario  ‘double-dip’  recession  is  assumed  with  growth 
rates of the advanced countries, including USA, falling to (-)1% in 2010-11, 
followed by 0% in 2011-12 and then gradually approaching the IMF forecast 
growth rate by 2014-15. In this case growth is slightly lower compared to the 
base case, but still impressive at over 7.5%. Inflation remains modest after the 
initial spike in 2010-11 as in the base case. The revenue-GDP ratio remains 
around 21.5% and the fiscal deficit declines to less than 6% by the end of 
2014-15. The public debt-GDP ratio also declines, but remains higher than in 
the base case. The current account deficit reaches almost 4% of GDP and this 





In this paper a fiscal consolidation program has been presented based on a 
policy simulation model. The exercise shows that it is possible to have such 
consolidation while at the same time maintaining high growth rates of around 
8% or more. The strategy is to gradually bring down the revenue deficit to 
zero  by  2014-15,  while  allowing  a  combined  fiscal  deficit  for  centre  plus 
states of about 6% of GDP. This provides the space for substantial government 
capital  expenditure,  which  translates  to  a  significant  public  investment 
program. This leads in turn to high overall investment directly and indirectly, 
via  the  net  ‘crowding  in’  effect  on  private  investment.  High  GDP  growth 
follows through various stages of the Keynes-Kahn multiplier. On the fiscal 
side, the fiscal deficit ratio declines despite rising public expenditure because 
of the combined effect of the strong income multiplier for government capital 
expenditure  (Das,  2007)  and  an  estimated  revenue  buoyancy  significantly 
greater than one. 
The exercise has also tested the robustness of this strategy under alternative 
scenarios of higher and lower advanced country growth. Though this leads to   20 
some variation in the rates of growth, fiscal deficit, public debt-GDP ratio, etc. 
the basic qualitative results of the fiscal consolidation strategy are sustained. It 
is also noted that the current account deficit varies between 2% to 4% of GDP 
in the alternative scenarios. 
Elimination of the revenue deficit by 2014-15 will entail determined action 
both on the revenue side as well as in government expenditure. On the revenue 
side, maintaining high tax buoyancy following the envisaged reform in direct 
and indirect taxes will be key. Pending such reforms, substantial mobilization 
of non-tax revenues and non-debt capital receipts will be important in the short 
run. On the expenditure side the Government needs to focus on measures to 
contain revenue expenditure growth and create the space for  robust  capital 
expenditure. The risk is that if these steps on the revenue or expenditure side 
turn  out  to  be  politically  or  administratively  infeasible,  then  the  proposed 
fiscal consolidation program could fail. 
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Appendix 1:  Data Sources 
ADEBT  is  the  accumulated  combined  aggregate  liability of the centre and 
state governments. Data from Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, 
RBI. 
ADVGDP  is  the  index  number  of  GDP  of  all  advanced  countries  taken 
together (1970=100). Data from the World Economic Outlook, 2009, IMF.  
AINF is the WPI based inflation for commodities with prices that are largely 
administered.  Data  from  Office  of  the  Economic  Advisor,  Ministry  of 
Commerce & Industry, GOI. 
CAPINFLOW  is  the  net  foreign  capital  inflow  to  India.  Data  from  the 
Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI.  
CAPSTOCK  is  the  net  capital  stock  at  1999-2000  prices  available  at  the 
beginning of any period. Data from the National Accounts Statistics , CSO, 
GOI.  
CAPSTOCK is the net capital stock in the beginning of the period. Data from 
the National Account Statistics (NAS), CSO, GoI. 
CHINAGDP is the index number of GDP of China (1970=100). Data from the 
World Economic Outlook, 2009, IMF.  
CPR  and  CPU  are  respectively  private  final  consumption  expenditure  and 
government  final  consumption  expenditure.  Data  from  National  Accounts 
Statistics, CSO, GOI.  
DUTY is the import weighted tariff rate. Data from website of the Planning 
Commission of India. 
ECAP is the current price combined capital expenditure of the central and the 
state  governments  together.  Data  from I n d i a n  P u b l i c  F i n a n c e  S t a t i s t i c s , 
Ministry of Finance, GOI.  
ECURR  is  the  combined  revenue  expenditure  of  the  central  and  state 
governments. Data from Indian Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance, 
GOI.  
ER is the exchange rate (Indian rupee per US$). Data from the Handbook of 
Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI.  
FD is the combined fiscal deficit of the central and state governments. Data 
from Indian Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance, GOI.  
FOREX is the foreign exchange reserves. Data from Handbook of Statistics on 
Indian Economy, RBI. 
GCP is the growth rate of wages, rents and interest cost in organized sector 
manufacturing  industries  in  India.  Data  from  Annual S u r v e y  o f  I n d u s t r i e s  
(ASI), GOI as reported in the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI.    25 
GDPCAPRATIO is the 3-year moving average of the ratio of GDP at factor 
cost  constant  price  to  net  capital  stock  at  constant  prices.  Data  for  both 
variables from National Accounts Statistics, CSO, GOI. 
GM3 and GM0 are the annual growth rates of broad and high powered money 
supply respectively. Data from the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 
RBI.  
GPWPI is the WPI based inflation of all commodities. Data from Office of the 
Economic Advisor, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, GOI.  
INVISIBBLE  is  net  invisible  earnings,  less  earnings i n  s e r v i c e s ,  i n  r u p e e s  
crore. Data from the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI. 
IPV and IPU are respectively gross private domestic capital formation, and 
gross  domestic  capital  formation  by  the  public  sector.  Data  from  National 
Accounts Statistics, CSO, GOI. 
MB  is  the  aggregate  market  borrowing  of  the  Government.  Data  from 
Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, RBI. 
MEGDP is the index number of GDP of Middle East countries taken together 
(1970=100). Data from the World Economic Outlook, 2009, IMF.  
MTO is the imports including services. Data from Handbook of Statistics on 
Indian Economy, RBI. 
NDCR  is  the  non  debt  capital  receipts  of  the  government  comprising  dis-
investment  etc.  Data  from  Indian  Public  Finance  Statistics,  Ministry  of 
Finance, GOI. 
OIL is the index number of international price of oil and petroleum products 
of the Indian basket in terms of rupees crore (1972-73 = 100). Data from the 
Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI. 
PLR  is  the  average  nominal  (simple)  prime  lending  rate  calculated  as  the 
average  RBI  prescribed  lending  rate  of  all  scheduled  commercial  banks 
including SBI and prime lending rates of term lending institutions like IDBI, 
IFCI, ICICI, IIBI/IRBI and that of SFCs. Handbook of Statistics on Indian 
Economy, RBI. 
RAIN is the rainfall index for India is taken from NASA website. 
RD is the combined revenue deficit of the central and state governments. Data 
from Indian Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance, GOI.  
REPO is the RBI determined bank rate taken up to 2003-04 and repo rate 
thereafter. Data from Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI. 
TAX is combined revenue receipts of the central and state governments. Data 
from Indian Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance, GOI.  
TD is the trade deficit. Data from Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 
RBI.   26 
USGDP is the index number of GDP of USA. Data from the World Economic 
Outlook, 2009, IMF.  
XTO is the exports including services. Data from Handbook of Statistics on 
Indian Economy, RBI. 
YMP, ZYMP, YF and ZYF are respectively GDP at current market prices, 
GDP at constant (1999-2000) prices, GDP at factor cost in current prices, and 
GDP  at  factor  cost  in  constant  (1999-2000)  prices.  Data  from  National 
Accounts Statistics, CSO, GOI.  
DUMCRISIS takes 1 for 2008-09 to capture the impact of global financial 
crisis and 0 for rest of the period. 
Dummy variables have been introduced in many of the equations largely to 
take  care  of  the  structural  shifts  and  also  the  outliers  in  the  estimated 
equations.   
AR (Auto Regression) and MA (Moving Average) terms have been used to 
control the presence of autocorrelation in the estimated equations.     27 
Appendix 2: The Estimated Equations 
 
Detailed  results  of  the  estimated  individual  functions  used  for  running  the 
simultaneous  equation  system  model  are  described  below  along  with  the 
analysis. 
 
1)  Private  nominal  consumption  (CPR)  has  been  hypothesized  to  be 
positively dependent on disposable income (YMPD) i.e. aggregate income less 
taxes and on its own past values (CPR(-1)). 
 
Sample size = 18 (1991-92 to 2008-09) 
 
CPR = 47581.09 + 0.49*YMPD + 0.35*CPR(-1) + 51836.18*DUMCPR 
   (7.09)      (18.93)    (8.52)   (9.54) 
 
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 2.6. 
 
The explained variation is almost 100% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.6. 
Both the coefficients are positive and significant with a positive significant 
intercept.  
 
2)  Nominal consumption expenditure of the central and state governments 
taken together (CPU) has been hypothesized to be positively dependent on the 
combined revenue expenditure of government (ECURR) and on its own past 
values (CPU(-1)). 
 
Sample size = 18 (1991-92 to 2008-09) 
 
CPU = 6224.56 + 0.21*ECURR + 0.63*CPU(-1) + 10436.90*DUMCPU 
           (1.69)      (6.87)     (7.85)           (5.58) 
 
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 1.72. 
 
The explained  variation is almost  100% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 
1.72.  Both  the  coefficients  are  positive  and  significant  with  a  positive 
significant intercept.  
 
3)  The first difference of GDP at factor cost at constant price (DZYF) has 
been hypothesized to be negatively dependent on its one year lagged second 
difference D(DZYF(-1)) and on its own past values (DZYF(-1)). 
Sample size = 18 (1992-93 to 2009-10) 
 
DZYF = 20574.37 + 0.88*DZYF(-1) - 0.29*D(DZYF(-1)) + 70896.45*DUMDZYF 
(1.73)      (10.09)    (-1.75)     (3.93) 
 
Adj R
2 =  0.89     DW Stat = 2.77.   28 
 
The explained variation is 89% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.77. The 
coefficient of one year lagged second difference is negative and insignificant 
while the coefficient of one year lag of the dependent variable is positive and 




4)  Investment by the government and public sector enterprises (IPU) has 
been hypothesized to be positively dependent on combined capital expenditure 
of government (ECAP) and on its own past values (IPU(-1)). 
 
Sample size = 15 (1994-95 to 2008-09) 
 
IPU = 7322.92 + 0.83*ECAP + 0.62*IPU(-1) + 17221.93*DUMIPU 
        (2.49)       (11.81)  (11.31)     (5.07) 
 
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 2.43. 
 
The explained  variation is almost  100% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 
2.43.  Both  the  coefficients  are  positive  and  significant  with  a  positive 
significant intercept. 
 
5)  The private investment to GDP ratio (IPV/YF) has been hypothesized 
to be negatively dependent upon the average prime lending rate and positively 
dependent  on  the  ratio of  expected  real  output  to full  capacity  real  output 
(RATIO) and the government investment rate (IPU/YF). 
 
Sample size = 18 (1991-92 to 2008-09) 
 
IPV/YF = -0.69 - 0.01*PLR + 0.93*RATIO + 0.53*(IPU/YF) + 0.07*DUMIPV + 0.01*DUMCRISIS 
(-18.97)   (-21.22)        (30.02)  (4.21)    (24.25)   ( 3 . 6 6 )  
 
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 2.87. 
 
The explained  variation is almost  100% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 
2.87. All the coefficients are significant with a negative significant intercept. 
We  have  added  a  crisis  dummy  here  following  the  ‘financial  crisis’  of 
developed World. 
 
6)  The value of imports in rupee terms (IMPORT) has been hypothesized 
to  be  positively  dependent  on  GDP  at  factor  cost  (YF)  and  the  average 
international price of oil and petroleum products in the Indian basket (OIL) 
and negatively dependent upon the average rupee-dollar exchange rate (ER). 
 
Sample size = 17 (1992-93 to 2008-09) 
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IMPORT = -10372 + 0.24*YF + 79.76*OIL - 6117*ER + 42936*DUMMTO - 27395*DUMCRISIS 
     (-0.73)      (45.01)    (25.85)        (-13.69)         (20.65)    (-4.62) 
 
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 2.19. 
 
The explained  variation is almost  100% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 
2.19. All the coefficients are significant with a negative intercept. We have 
added a crisis dummy here following the ‘financial crisis’ of developed World. 
 
7)  The first difference of exports in rupee terms (D(EXPORT)) has been 
hypothesized  to  be  positively  dependent  on the  first  difference  of  GDP  of 
advanced  countries  (ADVGDP)  and  negatively  dependent  upon the  import 
weighted average tariff rate (DUTY). 
 
Sample size = 17 (1992-93 to 2008-09) 
 
D(EXPORT)=174058+8111.6*D(ADVGDP)-7170.3*DUTY+53598*DUMXTO-108671*DUMCRISIS + 0.5*AR(1) 
      (20.29)      (10.46)     (-20.47)   (11.56)       (14.43)      (36.26) 
 
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 2.52. 
 
The explained variation is almost 99% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.52. 
All the coefficients are significant with a positive significant intercept. We 
have added one auto regressive term (AR1) in order to take care of time series 
property. We have also added a crisis dummy here following the ‘financial 
crisis’ of developed World. 
 
8)  The  wholesale  price  index  based  inflation  (GPWPI)  has  been 
hypothesized  to  be  positively  dependent  on  the  increase  in  administered 
commodity prices (AINF), the growth rate in narrow money supply (GM1) 
and the increase in cost of production (GCP) and negatively dependent on the 
rainfall index (RAIN) in India. 
 
Sample size = 16 (1993-94 to 2008-09) 
 
GPWPI = -5.79 +0.21*AINF +0.09*GM1  +0.02*GCP +0.01*RAIN  +2.3*DUMPWPI +2.8*DUMCRISIS+0.63*AR(2) 
(-4.67)  (11.43)      (2.99)   (1.88)        (5.34)    (14.28)    (7.40)        (14.37) 
 
Adj R
2 =  0.98     DW Stat = 3.29. 
 
The explained variation is almost 98% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 3.29, 
which is higher than the acceptable limit. All the coefficients are significant. 
We have added one auto regressive term (AR2) in order to take care of time 
series  property.  We  have  also  added  a  crisis  dummy  here  following  the 
‘financial crisis’ of developed World. 
 
9)  The  rupee-dollar  exchange  rate  (ER)  has  been  hypothesized  to  be 
negatively dependent on the net capital inflow (CAPINFLOW).   30 
 
Sample size = 14 (1995-96 to 2008-09) 
 
ER = 45.91 - 3.61e-05*CAPINFLOW + 6.45DUMER +1.52*AR(1)-0.63*AR(2) 
      (27.16)         (-13.95)            (5.47)     (10.55)      (-5.00) 
 
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 1.50. 
 
The explained variation is almost 100% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.5. 
The coefficient is negative significant with a positive significant intercept. We 
have added two auto regressive terms (AR1 & AR2) in order to take care of 
time series property. 
 
10)   The net capital inflow (CAPINFLOW)  has been assumed to  be a 
function of GDP of China (CHINAGDP) that of United States (USGDP) and 
Indian domestic real GDP (ZYMP) at market price. 
 
 
Sample size = 18 (1991-92 to 2008-09) 
 
CAPINFLOW = -144320 - 20.6*CHINAGDP + 11.7*USGDP + 0.08*ZYMP + 
    ( - 3 . 3 0 )     ( - 1 . 5 8 )     ( 2 . 5 9 )    ( 1 . 8 1 )  
 
                          181174.5*DUMCAP - 58039.2*DUMCRISIS 
               ( 1 3 . 8 1 )       ( - 5 . 3 9 )  
  
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 1.81. 
 
The explained variation is almost 99% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.81. 
The coefficients are significant with a negative significant intercept. We have 
added a crisis dummy here following the ‘financial crisis’ of developed World. 
 
11) The  net  invisible  flow  of  current  account  of  balance  of  payment 
(INVISIBLE)  has  been  hypothesized  to  be  a  function  of joint  GDP  of the 
advanced countries (ADVGDP) and the Middle East (MEGDP).  
 
Sample size = 17 (1992-93 to 2008-09) 
 
INVISIBLE =-48600 +105.06*(MEGDP +ADVGDP)  +16919.1*DUMINV +13575.6*DUMCRISIS +0.6AR(1) 
                    (-5.85)       (17.10)        (5.06)                        (2.79)             (2.90) 
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 2.02. 
 
The explained variation is almost 99% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.02. 
The coefficients are significant with a negative significant intercept. We have 
added a crisis dummy here following the ‘financial crisis’ of developed World. 
We have also added one auto regressive term (AR1) in order to take care of 
time series property. 
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12) The average  prime lending rate (PLR) has  been hypothesized to be 
positively dependent on the WPI inflation rate (GPWPI), the RBI determined 
repo rate (REPO) and the market borrowing of the government (MB). 
 
Sample size = 14 (1995-96 to 2008-09) 
 
PLR = 5.99 + 0.11*GPWPI + 0.77*REPO + 1.78e-06*MB + 0.75*DUMPLR 
      (37.18)       (8.15)        (55.75)          (2.69)      (17.04) 
 
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 1.90. 
 
The explained variation is almost 99% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.90. 
The coefficients are significant with a positive significant intercept.  
 
13) The inflation in GDP deflator (GPGDP) has been hypothesized to be 
positively dependent on the inflation based on WPI (GPWPI). 
 
Sample size = 20 (1990-91 to 2009-10) 
 
GPGDP = 0.14 + 0.98*GPWPI + 3.82*DUMPGDP 
(0.35)       (17.17)    (10.18)    
 
Adj R
2 =  0.94     DW Stat = 3.03. 
 
The explained variation is almost 94% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 3.03, 
which is higher than the acceptable level. The coefficient is significant with a 
positive intercept.  
 
14) The  narrow  money  (GM1)  has  been  hypothesized  to  be  positively 
dependent on the high-powered reserve money (GM0). 
 
Sample size = 18 (1991-92 to 2008-09) 
 
GM1 = -36346.31 + 1.37*M0 + 42635.34*DUMM1 - 81273.64*4DUMCRISIS 
                 ( - 1 0 . 0 3 )           ( 1 3 6 . 9 5 )      ( 1 0 . 7 6 )                       (-8.13) 
 
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 2.50. 
 
The explained variation is almost 99% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.50. 
The coefficient is positive and significant with a negative significant intercept. 
We have added a crisis dummy here also following the ‘financial crisis’ of 
developed World. 
 
15) The  stock  of  reserve  money  (M0)  has  been  hypothesized  to  be 
positively  dependent  on  foreign  exchange  reserves  (FOREX)  and  market 
borrowing by the government (MB).   32 
 
Sample size = 18 (1991-92 to 2008-09) 
 
M0 = 103854.76  - 0.43*FOREX + 0.98*MB + 64698.70*DUMGM0 +  115994.77*DUMCRISIS 
         (17.64)      (27.05)    (8.49)               (5.99)         (7.44)     
 
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 1.98. 
 
The explained  variation is almost  100% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 
1.98. The coefficients are significant with a positive significant intercept. We 
have  added  a  crisis  dummy  here  also  following  the  ‘financial  crisis’  of 
developed World. 
 
16) The  combined  revenue  receipt  of  Central  and  State  governments 
(TAX)  has  been  hypothesized  to  be  positively  dependent  on  the  GDP  at 
nominal market price (YMP). 
 
Sample size = 18 (1991-92 to 2008-09) 
 
LOG(TAX) = -6.80 + 1.33*LOG(YMP) + 0.06*DUMTAX + 0.90*AR(1) 
                  (-2.71)       (8.74)    (4.94)         (17.06) 
 
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 2.16. 
 
The explained  variation is almost  100% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 
2.16. The coefficient is significant with a negative significant intercept. We 
have added one auto regressive term (AR1) in order to take care of time series 
property. 
 
17) The combined revenue expenditure of government (ECURR) has been 
hypothesized to be positively dependent on the nominal GDP at factor cost 
(GM0) and on its own past values. 
 
Sample size = 18 (1991-92 to 2008-09) 
 
ECURR = -4141.94 + 0.69*ECURR(-1) + 0.10*YF + 121621.23*DUMECURR +175815.36*DUMCRISIS 
           (-1.31)       (13.42)          (8.97)       (6.06)            (21.55) 
 
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 2.15. 
 
The explained  variation is almost  100% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 
2.15. The coefficients are positive and significant with a negative intercept. 
We  have  added  a  crisis  dummy  here  following  the  ‘financial  crisis’  of 
developed  World  to  capture  the  fiscal  stimulus  including  the  6
th p a y  
commission impact. 
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18) The  first  difference  of  capital  stock  at  the  beginning  of  any  period 
(CAPSTOCK) has been hypothesized to be positively dependent on the total 
investment of last period (i.e. private investment plus government investment 
IPV(-1)+IPU(-1)). 
 
Sample size = 17 (1992-93 to 2008-09) 
 
D(CAPSTOCK) = 80351.29 + 0.43*(IPV(-1)+IPU(-1)) + 137422.67*DUMCAPS 
  (9.87)        (34.24)       (5.61)    
  
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 1.44. 
 
The explained variation is 99% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.44. The 
coefficient is significant with a positive significant intercept.  
 
19) The constant price GDP at factor cost (ZYF) has been hypothesized to 
be positively dependent on GDP at constant market price (ZYMP). 
 
Sample size = 19 (1991-92 to 2009-10) 
 
ZYF = -27970.54 + 0.79*ZYMP + 0.16*ZYMP(-1) 
               ( - 4 . 7 7 )               ( 1 7 . 4 3 )              ( 3 . 1 5 )  
 
Adj R
2 =  0.99     DW Stat = 1.86. 
 
The explained  variation is almost  100% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 
1.86. The coefficient is significant with a negative significant intercept. 
 
20) The market borrowing of the government (MB) has been hypothesized 
to be positively dependent on the fiscal deficit of last year (FD (-1). 
  
Sample size = 16 (1993-94 to 2008-9) 
 
MB = -22693.57 + 0.75*FD(-1) + 59681.33*DUMCRISIS + 57159.69*DUMMB 
             (-4.93)       (23.84)       (9.08)                      (9.73) 
 
Adj R
2 =  0.98     DW Stat = 2.29. 
 
The explained variation is 98% and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.29. The 
coefficient is significant with a negative significant intercept. We have added a 
crisis dummy here also due to fiscal stimulus following the ‘financial crisis’ of 
developed World.   34 
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